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A dilemma for permissibility-based solutions to the
paradox of supererogation
Marina Uzunova and Benjamin Ferguson
1. The paradox
Consider the following case:
(Alice) Alice has received a much deserved $1,000 bonus from her employer.
Lately she has worked long hours and would like to spend the money on a
holiday. However, she recently heard a compelling appeal for funds to sup-
port a women’s literacy initiative in low income countries. Alice reasons that
although it would be morally better to donate the bonus, it would not be
morally impermissible to use it for a holiday.
Donating the bonus is an example of a supererogatory act, according to the
‘standard account’ (Portmore 2017: 287) of supererogation: an act that is both
morally optional and morally better than another permissible act. Ordinary
moral intuitions support the existence of supererogatory acts. As Dreier
(2004: 145) puts it, ‘we take it for granted that there are supererogatory
acts, and it would be incredible if the very idea of supererogation turned out
to be incoherent’. Yet, the ordinary intuition encounters a theoretical chal-
lenge, known as the ‘paradox of supererogation’ (Archer 2013a, Dorsey 2013,
Dreier 2004, Grigore 2019, Heyd 2019 and Horgan and Timmons 2010).
Following Horgan and Timmons (2010: 36–37), we characterize the para-
dox of supererogation as a conflict between three conditions: supererogation,
moral continence and the very weak classical view.1 To define these condi-
tions, we need some preliminaries. Suppose that there is a (finite) collection of
token acts potentially available to an agent. The menu of token acts that is
actually available in a particular context is a subset of this collection. Further,
suppose that it is possible to compare all potentially available options accord-
ing to their moral goodness.2 Finally, suppose that it is possible to compare (at
least some) acts with respect to the strength of moral reasons that support
them. Then the three conditions can be formulated as follows.
1 Horgan and Timmons’s account uses these conditions, but they do not use these labels.
Continence comes from Davidson (1980) and the very weak classical view is a weakened
version of a condition found in Ferguson and Köhler (2020: §2.2), which itself is a weaker
version of the classical view of intentional action (Davidson 1963).
2 We are aware of challenges to the completeness assumption, primarily on the basis of incom-
parability. Such an answer, however, cannot vindicate supererogation because, as Heyd
(1982: 5) points out, supererogation requires ‘a common and continuous scale of values
shared by supererogation and duty’.
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(Classical supererogation) There exists an act – called a ‘supererogatory act’
– in the agent’s menu of available options that is morally optional (permis-
sible toperform andpermissible tonotperform)andalsomorallybetter than
another available morally permissible act.
(Moral continence) If there are strictly stronger moral reasons to perform act
x than there are to perform act y, then y is morally impermissible.
(The very weak classical view) If act x is morally better than act y, then there
is a stronger moral reason to perform x than there is to perform y.
The conflict between these three conditions is straightforward. The very weak
classical view implies that if act x is morally better than act y, then x is also
supported by stronger moral reasons, and hence, by moral continence, y is
morally impermissible. This conflicts with classical supererogation, which
claims that there can exist morally optional acts that are morally better than
other permissible acts.
There are many ways to escape the paradox. Most contemporary resolu-
tions argue that the reasons in moral continence and the very weak classical
view differ in kind (Dreier 2004, Horgan and Timmons 2010, Ferry 2015;
Mu~noz forthcoming provides a nice overview of this strategy. A second reso-
lution claims that the permissions in classical supererogation and moral con-
tinence differ in kind. This permissibility solution, as we will call it, is defended
by Dorsey (2013, 2016).
In what follows, we focus on the permissibility solution. We show that both
Dorsey’s solution and other permissibility-based solutions that distinguish all-
things-considered permissibility from moral permissibility encounter a di-
lemma. We outline the structure of permissibility-based solutions and then
introduce the dilemma.
2. Permissibility-based solutions
Permissibility-based solutions claim that there are two sorts of permissions:
one in the classical supererogation condition and a different sort in the moral
continence condition. According to Dorsey’s (2013: 369) account, we should
understand supererogation as granting all-things-considered (rational) per-
missions which may be sensitive to prudential, moral, aesthetic, legal and
other considerations. Moral continence concerns the narrower domain of
moral permissibility and hence grants pro tanto permissions. Dorsey thus
escapes the paradox by replacing the classical supererogation condition with:
(All-things-considered supererogation) There exists an act – called a ‘super-
erogatory act’ – in the agent’s menu of available options that is all-things-
considered optional (permissible to perform and permissible to not perform)
and also morally better than another available all-things-considered permis-
sible act.
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The escape is straightforward. There is no paradox because, as Dorsey puts it,
we should ‘treat supererogatory actions not as morally better than [what] is
morally required, but as morally better than [what] is rationally [or all-things-
considered] required’ (2013: 373, emphasis added). Morality may be stringent
and demand the morally best (as moral continence and the very weak classical
view imply), but rationality is more permissive and can let us do what is
morally suboptimal (as all-things-considered supererogation implies). In other
words, there is no paradox because ‘immorality can be rationally [or all-
things-considered] permitted’ (Dorsey 2013: 370).
Dorsey points out that there are ‘two potential ways this solution might go
wrong’: there may be no workable bridge condition between all-things-
considered and moral permissions, or ‘even if there is such an account . . .
this proposal is just implausible’ (Dorsey 2013: 373). So far Dorsey’s critics
have focused on the latter problem, arguing that Dorsey’s ‘redefinition’ of
supererogation simply moves the goalposts (Archer 2013b: 185–86,
Portmore 2017: 286) without vindicating ordinary intuitions about super-
erogation. For example, although it entails that Alice is rationally permitted
to refrain from donating, it cannot deliver the intuition that she has a moral
permission to take her holiday.
Yet, defenders of permissibility solutions could argue that puzzles surround-
ing supererogation arise precisely because our intuitions confuse moral and
rational permissions. In this paper we set aside debates about the external
plausibility of Dorsey’s account and instead focus on the first kind of objec-
tion. We consider whether the permissibility solution can succeed on its own
terms, with or without a bridge condition that allows for supererogation.
We take a bridge condition that we consider most plausible, and which is
implied by the conjunction of two conditions Dorsey accepts: his own ‘reasons
permission’ (2013: 374) condition and the very weak classical view.
(Goodness permission) If act x is morally better than y and y is all-things-
considered permissible, then x is also all-things-considered permissible.
The goodness permission condition allows ordering the all-things-considered
permissibility of acts along a moral goodness axis. Of course, a permissibility-
based solution need not accept goodness permission. We consider the merits of
goodness permission as well as the possibility of doing without a bridge con-
dition and conclude that neither option is plausible. Thus, the permissibility
solution is not viable. First, we argue that the permission to refrain from
performing supererogatory acts is a conditional permission. Then, we show
that this leads to a dilemma for permissibility accounts.
3. The conditional permissibility of omissions
Supererogatory acts are optional, in the sense that it is permissible to perform
them and to refrain from performing them. However, there is an important
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asymmetry in these permissions because the permissibility of refraining from
performing a supererogatory act depends also on the act the agent performs
instead.3 Although Alice may be permitted to refrain from donating to charity,
this permission is not unconditional. For example, it is not permissible for Alice to
refrain from donating if instead she plans to use the bonus to promote illiteracy.
Acts are supererogatory with respect to a particular agenda or menu of
options. In this sense we may say that the omission of supererogatory acts is
conditionally permissible. This point holds both for the permission solution’s
all-things-considered conception of supererogation and for classical super-
erogation. In order to incorporate this menu-dependence, both accounts of
supererogation must substitute the permissibility of not doing x by a condi-
tional permissibility which we define as follows (for all-things-considered
supererogation):
(Conditional permissibility of omissions) Refraining from doing act x is
all-things-considered permissible conditionally on doing another act y if
and only if doing y is all-things-considered permissible and in the menu of
options.
The conditional permissibility of omissions might seem obvious and yet this
distinction has important implications for the success of a permissibility-based
solution. Before we explain why conditional permissibility is important, we
first present the following two properties that the conditional permissibility of
omissions might satisfy:
(Monotonicity) If refraining from doing x is all-things-considered permissible
conditionally on doing y and z is morally better than y, then refraining from
doing x is also all-things-considered permissible conditionally on doing z.
(Symmetry) If refraining from doing x is all-things-considered permissible
conditionally on doing y and z is just as morally good as y, then refraining
from doing x is also all-things-considered permissible conditionally on
doing z.
These properties capture the intuition that if you are permitted not to do what
is morally best because you are permitted to do a morally inferior act, then you
should still be permitted not to do what is morally best if you were to do as
much (symmetry) or more (monotonicity) good instead. However, as we argue
in the next section, permissibility-based solutions run into problems regardless
of whether they satisfy or violate one or both of these conditions. And what is
important to note here is that these problems become apparent when we are
explicit about and pay attention to the conditional nature of the permissibility
of omissions.
3 Note that this asymmetry differs from the more common asymmetry between acts and omis-
sions defended by non-consequentialists.
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4. The dilemma
Recall that permissibility-based solutions solve the paradox of supererogation
by claiming that morally suboptimal (and hence, by the moral continence
condition, morally impermissible) acts are nevertheless all-things-considered
permissible. Let ymin be the least morally good act that is all-things-considered
permissible.4 For example, in Alice’s case, we’ll simply stipulate that ymin is the
act of spending the $1,000 bonus on a holiday.5
By definition, anything morally worse than ymin is all-things-considered
impermissible. But what about acts that are morally better than ymin? There
are two possibilities: first, if the goodness permission condition is satisfied,
then moral goodness orders all-things-considered permissibility in the sense
that anything morally better than the permissible ymin is also all-things-
considered permissible (see Figure 1a); second, if goodness permission is vio-
lated, then there could be acts that are morally better than ymin and yet all-
things-considered impermissible (see Figure 1b). We believe the second case is
more problematic so we will discuss it first.
4.1 Rejecting goodness permission
If a permissibility-based solution rejects goodness permission, then it allows
acts like z in Figure 1b, which are morally better than the morally worst per-
missible act (ymin) and yet which are all-things-considered impermissible. Here
is an example:
(Alice (b)) As before, Alice has a choice between donating the full $1,000
bonus (xmax) and spending it all on a holiday (ymin). However, she can now
also choose to spend $500 on a holiday and donate the other half (z).
(a) (b)
Figure 1. (a) Illustrates what accepting the goodness permission entails: it is possible to order all
all-things-considered permissible acts from the morally worst (ymin) to the morally best (xmax).
(b) Illustrates what rejecting the condition entails: there can exist acts (z) which are better than the
morally worst permissible act (ymin) but are all-things-considered impermissible.
4 In the language prevalent in the literature on supererogation, ymin is our ‘minimal duty’ (and
hence an erogatory act): anything morally worse than ymin is all-things-considered
impermissible.
5 One could, of course, imagine worse acts that are still permissible. The broader point is that
goodness permission requires that however moral and rational theories set ymin, they should
also entail that those acts they claim are morally better than ymin are also all-things-considered
permissible.
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Suppose that donating everything and spending it all on the holiday are both
all-things-considered permissible while splitting the sum in half is all-things-
considered impermissible.
The Alice (b) case violates goodness permission and there might be good
reasons for such a violation. For example, in his later writings, Dorsey
(2016: 172–206) invokes what he calls the ‘normative significance of the
self’. This view allows giving heavier weight to agent-centric reasons related
to the promotion of one’s life projects and commitments. For instance, if the
immersion in distant cultures is part of Alice’s life project and if splitting the
amount (z) is insufficient for contributing to this project, then splitting the
amount might turn out to be all-things-considered impermissible.
The trouble is that while a violation of goodness permission might be plausibly
justified, it necessarily implies a violation of monotonicity and that is less plaus-
ible. Recall that goodness permission concerns the performance of acts, while
monotonicity concerns the omission of acts. Alice (b) violates monotonicity: not
donating is all-things-considered permissible conditionally on spending the entire
bonus on a holiday, but not donating is all-things-considered impermissible con-
ditional on spending only half. Put differently, Alice has a licence not to donate if
she were to donate nothing but no such permission if she were to donate half.
Such non-monotonicity of omissions is at odds with common intuitions about the
optionality of supererogatory acts. Additionally, it allows us to see that views,
such as the ‘normative significance of the self’, that reject goodness permission are
importantly incomplete: they need to provide a plausible account not just for
violations of goodness permission but also for the violations of monotonicity
which necessarily follow. And to do that, they need to pay attention to the con-
ditional nature of the permissibility of omissions.
4.2 Accepting goodness permission
If a permissibility-based solution wants to avoid the non-monotonicity of
omissions, it can accept goodness permission and grant that any act that is
morally better than what is minimally all-things-considered permissible (ymin)
is also permissible (Figure 1a). This move avoids violations of monotonicity
but leads to other problems. Consider:
(Alice (a)) As before Alice has a choice between donating $1,000 (xmax) and
spending it allonaholidaywithherpartner (ymin).Additionally, shecannow
spend the bonusonaholidaywithadistant relative insteadofherpartner (w)
which is just as morally good as ymin. All three acts are all-things-considered
permissible.
Consider the two minimally permissible acts that are also equally morally good:
going on a holiday with a partner (ymin) and with a distant relative (w). Now start
increasing the non-moral considerations that speak against w. The question is: is
there some threshold beyond which non-moral considerations tip the previously
all-things-considered permissibility of w into impermissibility?
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4.2.1 Suppose there is no threshold. If the answer is ‘no’, then there is no
amount of non-moral considerations that can make the all-things-considered
permissible w all-things-considered impermissible. Such a move satisfies sym-
metry of omissions but should be resisted by permissibility-based solutions. The
problem is that all-things-considered – as opposed to moral – permissibility is
then a trivial addition without real normative force. The real permissibility
work would be done not by considerations that go beyond morality, but by
moral goodness: there is a minimal threshold of moral goodness that grants a
permission to do certain acts. If a permissibility-based solution were to take this
route, then it collapses into a moral-goodness satisficing account (and hence
into classical supererogation). Instead of disaggregating permissions, it should
be disaggregating moral goodness.
4.2.2 Suppose there is a threshold. Alternatively, suppose the answer is ‘yes’.
Then we end up with two equally morally good acts one of which is all-things-
considered permissible (ymin) while the other is all-things-considered impermis-
sible (w). This is a violation of symmetry. We find violations of symmetry
problematic in themselves. However, others may not share this intuition.
Particularly, they, like Dorsey, might believe that certain non-moral considera-
tions – such as agent-centric reasons to promote one’s life projects – can plausibly
lead to asymmetries (2016: 172). Even so, the broader point is that such accounts
must also explain who determines the nature and strength of the non-moral
considerations that can lead to asymmetries. And regardless of whether this is
determined ‘internally’ by the agent herself or ‘externally’ a problem arises.
To see how, take the ‘external’ case first. Suppose that Alice is not the one
who determines the nature and strength of the non-moral considerations that
make it all-things-considered permissible or impermissible not to donate con-
ditional on taking a holiday with a distant relative. There are two problems
with this. First, it is unclear how such an odd combination of agent and non-
agent-centric considerations can explain why Alice should include them in her
calculus. And, more importantly, if it is not Alice who determines the nature
and degree of these considerations, it is hard to understand how these are not
ultimately driven by moral considerations.6 But if that is so, then, again, such a
permissibility-based solution will collapse into a moral satisficing account and
hence into classical supererogation.
Alternatively, suppose that it is Alice who sets the threshold and decides on
the kind of considerations that enter the calculus. Such a response collapses
into egoism: if Alice herself chooses the determinants of her conditional
6 Dorsey suggests that the socialized nature of our own projects, and the role of moral educa-
tion in eventually ‘increasing the convergence between moral requirements and the demands
of practical rationality’ (2016: 207) provides a possible answer. But this answer shifts respon-
sibility away from the agent by allowing her to set the terms of her own responsibility (that is,
by granting her the all-things-considered permission not to do the morally superior act), even
while these terms are judged morally undesirable.
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permissibility not to donate, then it is up to her to expand the domain of the
minimally permissible. And if such a permissibility solution collapses into
egoism, then it makes the permission to not perform the optimal act granted
by all-things-considered supererogation equivalent to rational satisficing. Yet
rational satisficing, as authors such as Dreier (2004) and Davidson (1980)
have forcefully argued, faces serious conceptual problems that undermine its
coherence.
We have argued that permissibility-based solutions encounter a dilemma. If
they reject goodness permission, then they allow for non-monotonic omissions
which are counterintuitive. If they accept goodness permission, then they col-
lapse into rational satisficing if the threshold is determined by the agent herself.
And if there is no threshold, or if the threshold is determined by considerations
other than the agent’s, they collapse into the classical account of supereroga-
tion. These problems provide strong reasons to abandon permissibility-based
solutions in favour of alternatives, such as reason-based solutions that focus
on disaggregating moral and non-moral reasons.7
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